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Abstract 
Banks that follow conditional conservatism in their loan loss accounting treatments benefit 
from a reduction in crash risk. The key discretionary loan loss accounting channels are 
provisions and allowances. We show that conditional conservatism reduces crash risk of 
small banks during periods of credit contraction and boom. Interestingly, for large banks, 
crash risk is not reduced by more conservative accounting even for those with higher levels 
of opacity. Hence regulation prompting for more conservative bank loan loss accounting 
does not present a significant opportunity to limit systemic effects arising from abrupt price 
declines in the stocks of large banks.  
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1. Introduction 
Investors in banks and bank regulators are concerned with large declines in bank 
stock prices, also referred to as crash risk. Banks’ crash risk has been shown to be 
associated with measures of their loan loss accounting treatments (Cohen et al., 2014). The 
source of the relationship is the inherent opacity of banks, which makes the risks they take 
on hard to verify and exposes them to crash risk resulting from the accumulation of 
undisclosed bad news (Jin and Myers, 2006, Hutton et al., 2009). Along these lines, the 
regulatory bodies, Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), have raised concerns about bank accounting 
behavior, particularly the potential overstatement of assets caused by a delayed recognition 
of credit losses associated with loans (and other financial instruments), particularly during 
the financial crisis (FASB, 2012). 
Cohen et al. (2014) examine the relationship between one specific aspect of bank 
accounting behavior in the context of earnings management and stock price crashes. In a 
broader context, another aspect of accounting behavior, conditional conservatism, has been 
shown to predict crash risk for firms (Kim and Zhang, 2015, Andreou et al., 2016a), 
although not tested explicitly for banks. Following the ideas in Basu (1997), conditional 
conservatism refers to accounting treatments that require a higher degree of verification to 
recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses. In this respect, 
although earnings management and conditional conservatism are related, they are not the 
same (Watts, 2003). Conditional conservatism is a more persistent behavior than earnings 
management; and banks have been shown to have a strong persistent component that 
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exposes them to crash risk (Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). Therefore, it remains an important 
unresolved empirical question whether the effect of conditional conservatism, to offset 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour as reported by previous studies (e.g., Watts, 2003, 
Kothari et al., 2009), can contribute further to the understanding and possibly control of 
banks’ crash risk. Therefore, this study examines the relationship between conditional 
conservatism and bank-specific crash risk. Further, we examine how the relationship varies 
over the banking lending cycle, between large and small banks, and between opaque and 
transparent banks. We also differentiate the effect of conservatism from the effect of 
earnings management.1 
For our empirical investigation, we use a large sample of US bank-level information 
during the period 1995-2010. Following Chen et al. (2001), Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et 
al. (2011), we measure the crash risk of individual banks by employing three different 
measures of firm-specific stock price crashes. These measures of crash risk capture 
different aspects of the relative size and magnitude of share price crashes. To capture the 
degree of conservatism of a bank, we use Basu’s (1997) cross-sectional measure of 
conservatism using information from the bank’s income statement and balance sheet (Khan 
and Watts, 2009; Beatty and Liao, 2011).  
Since conditional conservatism restricts managers’ opportunistic behavior to 
strategically withhold bad news and accelerate the release of good news and hence reduces 
agency problems (Watts, 2003; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Kim and Zhang, 2015, Andreou 
et al., 2016a), we expect that banks adopting conservative accounting practices to exhibit 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this paper we use the term conservatism to mean conditional conservatism as in Basu (1997). 
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less crash risk. However, the unique nature of banks and the extensive regulatory scrutiny 
that characterizes the industry suggest that the general relationship between conservatism 
and crash risk, found by Kim and Zhang (2015), need not necessarily hold for banks. 
Therefore, we first examine whether the relationship between conservatism and crash risk 
exists, and if so, attempt to identify the specific bank loan loss accounting channels and the 
defining bank characteristics for which this relationship persists.  
The empirical results indicate banks that follow conservatism in loan loss 
accounting on average significantly benefit from a reduction in future stock price crash risk. 
The main income statement channel between this accounting behavior and crash risk is via 
the loan loss provision treatment and not through the non-loan income statement item of 
earnings before provisions, suggesting either that the discretion over other income items is 
more limited or that investors find it easier to see through accounting treatment of non-loan 
items. Further, banks’ motivation to manage changes in earnings and maintain their loan 
portfolio risk to avoid regulatory scrutiny can lead to banks inflating their loan loss 
allowances in the balance sheet. Loan loss allowances represent an aggregation of past 
years’ loan loss provisions and the accounting treatment of net loan charge offs and loan 
recoveries. Prior studies indicate that banks attempt to manage these loan loss accounting 
treatments, for instance, to overstate their loan loss allowances to establish reserve buffers 
and maintain their capital ratios (e.g., Liu and Ryan, 2006; and Beck and Narayanamoorthy, 
2013). Since conservatism in loan loss provisions reduces reported net income in the 
income statement and also increases loan loss allowances in the balance sheet, accounting 
conservatism should also be reflected in the aggregate balance sheet item of loan loss 
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allowances. Moreover, greater recognition of net loan charge offs and a slower recognition 
of loan recoveries by bank managers can reflect accounting conservatism behavior. Hence, 
as a further investigation, we test whether conservatism operating through these various 
components of loan loss accounting – loan loss allowances, net loan charge offs and loan 
recoveries – can mitigate stock price crashes. The results indicate that conservatism 
behavior captured in the balance sheet item of loan loss allowances jointly predicts future 
crash risks, along with the conservatism operating through loan loss provisions. 
Additionally, we find that conservatism in the loan items of charge offs and recoveries 
contains no additional information related to crash risk. This results indicate the fact that 
loan charge offs and recoveries generally involve limited managerial discretion.  
Overall, the results show that loan loss provisions from the income statement and 
the balance sheet of loan loss allowances operate as the primary accounting channels 
through which conservatism in banks’ accounting behavior impacts crash risk. Our results 
are also economically significant, since an increase in conservatism in loan loss provisions 
from 10th to the 90th percentile reduces the probability of a crash by 14.2%. Similarly, for 
the continuous measures of crash risk, a one standard deviation increase in conservatism in 
loan loss provisions or loan loss allowances significantly decreases crash risk by 2.9% to 
3.2% standard deviations.   
Since prior research has demonstrated that earnings management predicts banks’ 
crash risk during the financial crisis (Cohen et al, 2014), we investigate the robustness of 
our findings and established that earnings management and lack of conservatism are 
associated with crash risk at different times. More specifically, consistent with Cohen et al. 
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(2014), earnings management tends to predict crash risk during crisis periods only, whereas 
lack of conservatism predicts crash risk more generally. This result is in line with the idea 
that conservatism has a more pervasive effect, whereas earnings management tends to be 
transitory and peaks during specific times. 
Next, we test whether the impact of banks’ conservatism on future stock price crash 
risk varies at different states of the banking cycle. Because conservatism seems to operate 
through loan loss accounting treatment, the quality of loan portfolios becomes an influential 
factor that may moderate the relation between conservatism and crash risk. As a result, the 
lending growth cycle represents an ideal setting to explore the impact of credit 
expansion/contraction that affects lending portfolio quality, on the relation between 
conservatism and crash risk. During high lending growth periods or the credit boom 
periods, banks take excessive risk through over-lending (Berger and Udell, 2004; Foos et 
al., 2010). Hence, in the high part of the cycle, agency problems are higher, suggesting a 
greater potential for bad news hoarding to generate future crash risk. Similar agency 
problems are heightened during the low part of the lending growth cycle or the credit 
crunch periods. Negative economic outcomes and dwindling bank performance create 
incentives for bank managers to delay bad news, which then cumulates and when released 
in the market will cause stock price crashes. Consistent with this conjecture, our empirical 
results indicate that during both credit boom and credit crunch periods, banks following 
conservative accounting practices significantly reduce their stock price crash risk, with the 
highest impact observed during the credit crunch periods. In the moderate phase of the 
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lending growth cycle we do not see a significant relationship between conservatism and 
crash risk.  
As an additional analysis, we test for the relationship using alternative banking 
business cycles that affect the lending portfolio quality. In particular, we test whether the 
relationship between conservatism and crash risk is pronounced during extreme market 
liquidity growth cycles (proxied by the monetary base variable, M1) as well as enhanced 
growth in the aggregate financial sector risk (measured by the systemic risk variable, 
CATFIN, developed by Allen et al., 2012). The results suggest that there is cyclical 
variation in the effect of conservatism on crash risk, and the relationship is indeed 
heightened during the extreme periods of monetary cycles and systemic risk.  
Our final tests concern the impact of banks’ information opacity (measured by the 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts) and bank size on the relationship between conservatism 
and crash risk. The ability to hide bad news is related to the degree of information opacity 
between managers and outside investors, which is also related to the size of the bank. 
Therefore, we expect a stronger effect of conservatism on crash risk for banks with greater 
information opacity and for smaller banks. Consistent with the information hypothesis, the 
results show that more bank opaqueness leads to a stronger relationship between 
conservatism and crash risk. However, this effect is present only for small banks. For large 
banks there is no relationship between conservatism and crash risk, even for those with 
higher levels of opacity.  
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Our findings complement other studies that have found a relationship between 
banks’ accounting behavior and crash risk. The result that conservatism affects crash risk 
differs from that of Cohen et al. (2014) who find that the relationship between earnings 
management and crash risk is only prominent during the crisis period. We also extend the 
analysis of the general relationship between accounting conservatism and crash risk of Kim 
and Zhang (2015) for banking institutions, by investigating the specific bank loan loss 
accounting channels through which conservatism is related to crash risk for banks, as well 
as the effect of the lending growth cycle on this relationship. They also complement studies 
which find, for firms in general, a relationship between crash risk and governance variables 
(Andreou et al, 2016a, Andreou et al, 2017). Using analysts’ forecast dispersion we also 
demonstrate how the relationship depends on banks’ opacity and bank size. Finally, we also 
show an important negative result which has significant policy implications: that there is no 
relationship between conservatism and crash risk for large banks, even among those with 
greater information opacity.  
The study makes several contributions to the debate on bank regulation and bank-
specific risk. It shows that the main channel whereby accounting conservatism influences 
crash risk is through loan loss accounting, and that this operates only at the high and low 
parts of the credit cycle (not the general economic cycle). It does not operate for large 
banks, suggesting that the existing level of transparency and accounting regulation already 
limits this effect for large banks. The results imply that it is important for smaller banks and 
their investors to be wary of non-conservative accounting practices on loans at the extremes 
of the credit cycle (but not necessarily at extremes of the economic cycle). For regulators, it 
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implies that there may be scope to limit the crash risk of smaller banks through regulating 
accounting conservatism but there appears to be limited scope for controlling the systemic 
crash risk of the banking sector by further use of that mechanism.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a literature 
review and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and measurement of 
variables. Section 4 reports the empirical results, and Section 5 presents the conclusions 
and implications. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
The agency problem in accounting has been recognized as a mechanism that affects 
firm-level risk. Jin and Myers (2006) and Hutton et al. (2009) observe that accounting 
opacity increases the probability of large negative stock returns, known as crash risk. They 
develop an imperfect information model where managers are willing to hide firm-specific 
negative news when the cost of hiding outweighs the benefit. Hiding bad news for an 
extended period of time, however, is unsustainable (Bleck and Liu, 2007, Kothari et al., 
2009). Hence, after a time, the accumulated negative information suddenly becomes 
publicly available, causing an unexpected large negative return outlier in the distribution of 
the firm’s stock returns.  
In this context, banks’ assets are inherently opaque and difficult to value by outside 
investors (Cheng et al., 2011; Gordon, 2014). Within such an environment managers might 
be able to overstate financial performance by withholding bad news when they have 
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incentives to do so. Such accounting manipulation, however, may result in crash risk. Kim 
and Zhang (2015) and Andreou et al. (2016a) show that firms practicing earnings 
conservatism effectively monitor the timely release of bad news, thereby reducing future 
crash risk. In a similar vein, conservatism among banking sector firms can act as a 
governance mechanism that prevents accumulation of hidden negative news resulting in 
less crash risk. This relationship, however, may be weaker within banks due to high 
regulatory scrutiny and supervision. In addition, since banks are highly leveraged 
instituti0ons, we would also expect banks to exhibit higher levels of conditional 
conservatism due to contracting demands, litigation costs and regulators’ preference (Watts 
2003; Armstrong et al., 2010). As a result, the relation between conservatism and crash risk 
for banks is still unclear. 
Banks have an incentive to innovate using loans where default probabilities are hard 
to assess (Thakor, 2011), and the potential for distortion is greatest for many loan assets 
which are long-lived, illiquid, and senior (Plantin et al., 2008). This implies that the most 
important channel from a potential relation between conservatism and crash risk is through 
the treatments of loans which directly affect banks’ earnings. Banks’ earnings are 
aggregated from various elements of the income statement, and thus to gain more insight 
into the mechanism through which conservatism may affect crash risk, it is important to 
decompose earnings conservatism into conservatism in the discretionary treatment of loan 
loss provisions and conservatism in the reporting of non-loan items, earnings before 
provisions. Bank managers are required to exercise considerable discretion in maintaining 
sound and accurate estimates of the future provisions. Loan loss provisions intend to 
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safeguard the bank against future loan failures by quantifying changes in expected future 
losses from credit risk in the loan portfolio. Provisions are reported in the income statement 
as expenses and thus reduce net income. At the same time, provisions reduce net loans 
outstanding by increasing the loan loss allowance on the balance sheet. Bank managers who 
practice conservative accounting recognize appropriate loan loss provisions each period in 
a timely manner depending on their forecasts of the expected losses and the balance of their 
loan loss allowance. Therefore, conservatism can also operate through the alternative 
components of loan loss accounting – loan loss allowances, net loan charge offs and loan 
recoveries. Loan loss allowances should accurately reflect expected future losses in a 
bank’s loan portfolio, after timely accounting recognition of charge offs and recoveries. 
Greater recognition of loan loss allowances and net loan charge offs, and a slower 
recognition of loan recoveries by bank managers can be associated with accounting 
conservatism behavior. Since conservative accounting practices reduce the amount of 
hidden negative news and hence reduce the agency problem between managers and outside 
investors, we would expect that banks with a high degree of conservatism in loan loss 
accounting information (both in the income statement and the balance sheet) should 
experience less crash risk. These assertions lead us to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Conservatism in loan loss accounting, operating through the income statement as well 
as the balance sheet treatments, reduces a bank’s future crash risk.  
 
Since we expect the primary channel linking conservatism and crash risk to be 
through loans, we expect the relationship between conservatism and crash risk to vary over 
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the bank lending growth cycle. During periods of expansion and high demand for loans 
(credit boom), the potential agency problem is high, as bank managers have the incentive to 
cater to this high demand through excessive lending (Berger and Udell, 2004; Foos et al., 
2010). Excessive lending will reduce the quality of the loan portfolio, however, leading to 
the temptation to hide bad news. The ability to hide bad news diminishes as bad news 
accumulates, thereby increasing the risk of abrupt release and stock prices crashes. Hence, 
there will be demand for conservative behavior by shareholders during the credit boom or 
the high cycle periods. Beatty and Liao (2011) provide evidence that the lending behavior 
of conservative banks remain conservative during periods of high lending growth. As a 
result, we expect the effect of conservatism on crash risk to be strong at the high part of the 
lending growth cycle. During the moderate part of the lending growth cycle, when business 
is as usual, the agency problem is less severe, as the incentives to cater to the market are 
low. Hence the relation between conservatism and crash risk should be less pronounced. At 
the low part of the lending growth cycle or credit crunch periods, the agency problem could 
also be severe since bad performance will exaggerate managerial career concerns and the 
incentives to hide bad news, which when released in the market will cause stock price 
crashes. However, during periods of economic downturns, since regulatory scrutiny as well 
as the risk of litigation is high, accounting conservatism increases contracting efficiency by 
discouraging bad news hoarding (Watts, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2010). Additionally, 
during the low part of the lending growth cycle, debt holders will demand conservative 
financial reporting (Balakrishnan, et al., 2015). Hence we expect conservative banks to 
reduce crash risk during the low period of the lending growth cycle. Overall, we expect a 
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stronger relationship between conservatism and crash risk during the extremes (high and 
low) of the lending growth cycle. Hence, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: The relationship between conservatism and future crash risk is more pronounced 
during the credit boom (high bank lending growth) periods and the credit crunch (low bank 
lending growth) periods.  
 
Finally, we examine how the effect of conservatism on crash risk is related to 
information opacity and bank size. We capture information opacity through dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Higher information opaqueness may aid bank managers in 
withholding valuable negative information from investors. For example, banks with high 
growth options and thus high information asymmetry between managers and outside 
investors have greater opportunities to hide negative information in an attempt to show 
better performance, especially during uncertain environments. In such environments, 
however, litigation risk will be high and, under accounting conservatism, bank managers 
would report conservatively in order to reduce the risk of litigation (Watts 2003). Hence the 
relationship between conservatism and crash risk will be more pronounced for banks with a 
high level of information asymmetry between inside managers and investors.  
In terms of bank size, smaller banks tend to disclose less information and attract less 
analyst coverage. So there is generally greater informational asymmetry among small 
banks. In addition, the nature of informational flow is largely clustered among small banks, 
with discrete news arrivals much more surrounding key events such as earnings 
announcements. Thus, small banks have greater opportunities to delay negative information 
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in an attempt to show better firm performance, especially during economic downturns. In 
contrast, large banks naturally exhibit proportionately less growth options and attract more 
analyst coverage, thus reducing the information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. Further, large banks have an incentive to engage in a higher level of 
accounting conservatism and transparency (Watts, 2003; and LaFond and Watts, 2008). 
Additionally, the demand for conservatism is greater when the separation of ownership and 
control is greater (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008) and 
when there is greater ownership by institutions (Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012), all of 
which characterize larger than smaller banks. Large banks tend to release information on a 
regular basis and hence should experience less aggregation of hidden information. Hence, 
we would expect the relation between accounting conservatism and crash risk to matter 
more for small banks and be less pronounced for large banks. Furthermore, since 
conservatism is a persistent behavior, it will be easier to monitor and control by outside 
agents, including regulators, shareholders, and other stakeholders. Therefore, we expect 
that large banks’ accounting policy choices may result in a level of transparency that limits 
the scope for large negative accounting surprises arising from persistent lack of 
conservatism.  
Based on the above arguments, we expect the impact of conservative accounting on 
crash risk to be related to the degree of information opacity and be more pronounced 
among banks with higher dispersion in banks’ earnings forecasts and for smaller banks. 
Hence, our third and fourth hypotheses are as follows: 
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H3: The relationship between conservatism and future crash risk is greater for banks with 
higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
H4: The relationship between conservatism and future crash risk is more pronounced for 
smaller banks. 
 
 
3. Variable Measurement 
3.1   Measurement of banks’ crash risk 
To investigate the impact of conservatism on bank-specific crash risk, we use three 
different measures of crash risk that reflect different aspects of the distribution of returns. 
We estimate bank-specific weekly returns using the following expanded index model 
regression: 
                
,
,2,,51,,4,,31,,22,,1, tjtmjtmjtmjtmjtmjjtj rrrrrr εβββββα ++++++= ++−−
                     (1) 
where tjr ,  is the return on stock j in week t and tmr ,  is the CRSP value-weighted market 
index in week t. To allow for non-synchronous trading we include lead and lag variables for 
the market index (Dimson, 1979). This regression removes market-wide return movements 
from firm returns, and thus residuals capture weekly bank-specific returns. Since residuals 
from Equation (1) are skewed, we define the bank-specific weekly return for firm j in week 
t ( tjw , ) as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual. Then, following Chen et al., 
(2001), Hutton et al. (2009), and Kim et al. (2011), we estimate three primary measures of 
crash risk.  
16 
 
First, we define an indicator variable CRASH that is equal to one when a bank 
experiences at least one crash week during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. A crash 
week occurs when a bank experiences firm-specific weekly returns 3.09 standard deviations 
below the mean firm-specific weekly returns for the entire fiscal year (3.09 is chosen to 
generate a frequency of 0.1% in the normal distribution).  
The second measure is the negative conditional skewness (NCSKEW). NCSKEW is 
the negative of the third moment of bank-specific weekly returns for each firm and year 
divided by the standard deviation of bank-specific weekly returns raised to the third power. 
Specifically, for a given firm in a fiscal year we calculate NCSKEW as follows:    
                          
.))(2)(1/[()1([ 2
3
2
,
3
,
2
3
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                       (2) 
Finally, following Chen et al. (2001), we compute the third measure of crash risk, 
the down-to-up volatility (DUVOL). DUVOL is calculated as follows: for each bank j over 
a fiscal year t, we separate all the weeks with firm-specific returns below the annual mean 
from those firm-specific weekly returns that are above the annual mean and categorize 
them as “down weeks” and “up weeks” respectively. We then compute the standard 
deviation for the two pre-defined subsamples. DUVOL is the log of the ratio of the standard 
deviations of the two subsamples, that for the “down weeks” over the standard deviation of 
the “up weeks”. Larger values of NCSKEW and DUVOL signify greater crash risk. CRASH 
focus on capturing negative firm-specific returns at the lowest tail of the return distribution 
and thus may be viewed as a measure of extreme crash risk. In contrast, NCSKEW and 
DUVOL focus on capturing a standardized skewness of negative firm-specific returns or the 
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asymmetry in standard deviation between “down” and “up” weeks, respectively, which 
implies that they also capture smaller crashes.   
 
3.2 Measurement of accounting conservatism 
We utilize information from banks’ income statements as well as their balance 
sheets in order to construct various income-statement- and balance-sheet-based measures of 
accounting conservatism. 
 
3.2.1 Income statement measures of conservatism 
Based on Khan and Watts (2009) and Beatty and Liao (2011), we use bank-quarter 
analysis and cross-sectional regressions to estimate Basu’s (1997) earnings conservatism 
measure. In accordance with previous literature, we remove bank-quarters with a price per 
share of less than $1 and bank-quarters with a negative book value of equity. Furthermore, 
we require twenty observations per quarter to run each regression. In particular, we 
estimate the following model: 
                       
0 1 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
( )
( )
NI D Returns MV MTB LEV
D Returns MV MTB LEV
β β µ µ µ µ
λ λ λ λ ε
= + × + × + + + +
× × + + + +                   (3) 
where NI is net income (Compustat “niq”) divided by lagged market value of equity 
(Compustat “cshoq” x share price at the end of the fiscal quarter), Returns are quarterly 
returns compounded from monthly returns beginning at the second month after the fiscal 
quarter end, D is an indicator variable which takes the value of one for negative Returns 
and zero otherwise, MV is market value of equity defined as the natural log of market value 
(Compustat “cshoq” x share price at the end of the fiscal quarter),  MTB is the market-to-
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book value calculated as the ratio of market value of equity (Compustat “cshoq” x share 
price at the end of the fiscal quarter) over book value of equity (Compustat “ceqq”), and 
LEV is the long term debt (Compustat “dlttq”) divided by market value of equity 
(Compustat “cshoq” x share price at the end of the fiscal quarter). 
Using the coefficient estimates from Equation (3) we calculate the earnings 
conservatism measure, NI_CONS, by cumulating CS over the previous three-year period to 
eliminate bias arising from less persistent conservatism. CS is calculated as follows: 
                                                   
1 2 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆCS MV MTB LEVλ λ λ λ= + + +
                                          (4) 
By construction, banks with higher NI_CONS values are considered more conservative and 
as a result they exhibit a smaller delay in expected loss recognition. Hence NI_CONS is a 
measure of asymmetric timeliness of net income in recognizing bad news versus good 
news. Net income, however, aggregates several line items of the income statement. Thus, to 
understand better the sources of conservatism, we decompose the net income conservatism 
into two components: (i) loan loss provision conservatism and (ii) earnings before provision 
conservatism. In doing so, we re-run the equation using as dependent variables either loan 
loss provision, LLP, or earnings before provision, EBP. Following the approach outlined 
above, we estimate LLP_CONS and EBP_CONS. Our primary prediction is that 
conservatism operates through loan loss provisions, which largely involve discretionary 
treatment rather than earnings before provisions whose treatment is non-discretionary. 
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3.2.2 Balance sheet measures of conservatism 
In constructing our loan loss allowance measure of conservatism, we follow Beatty 
and Liao (2011) and use the ratio of the allowance of loan loss provisions (Compustat 
“rclq”) divided by the non-performing loans (Compustat “npatq”). Banks that are more 
conservative are expected to have recognized more allowance of loan loss provisions 
relative to non-performing loans. Following this reasoning, our balance sheet conservatism 
measure, LLA_CONS, is the decile rank of the difference between lagged ratio and the 
median during the quarter. We also decompose loan loss allowances into “unadjusted” loan 
loss allowances (i.e. before adjustments in loan loss charge offs and loan recoveries), loan 
loss charge offs and loan loss recoveries (Nichols et al., 2009). Using these components, we 
create a measure of conservatism for each component of loan loss allowances following the 
rationale of Beatty and Liao (2011). Particularly, we calculate “unadjusted” loan loss 
allowance as the loan loss allowances plus loan charge offs minus loan loss recoveries 
(Compustat “rclq” plus “llwocr” minus “llrcr”) divided by the non-performing loans 
(Compustat “npatq”). Banks that are more conservative are expected to have recognized 
more unadjusted loan loss provisions relative to non-performing loans. Following this 
reasoning, our conservatism measure of “unadjusted” loan loss allowances 
(LLA_CONS_UNADJ) is the decile rank of the difference between the lagged ratio and the 
median during the quarter.  
We use the ratio of loan charge offs (Compustat “llwocr”) divided by the non-
performing loans (Compustat “npatq”) to construct the measure of conservatism in loan 
loss charge offs. Nichols et al (2009) suggest that loan charge offs likely reflect realizations 
of managers’ expectations of loan losses that became delinquent during the previous and 
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the current periods. At the same time, managers may be concerned about the size of loan 
loss allowance (preferring to avoid appearing over-reserved and receiving negative scrutiny 
from regulators and analysts); thus conservative banks should charge off more loans to 
avoid the appearance of overly large loan loss allowance. If they do so, however, during 
periods where the quality of the loan portfolio deteriorates, greater charge offs may simply 
signal the quality of the loan portfolio rather than conservatism. No such signal is revealed 
in the market in periods where the loan portfolio quality improves. Assuming that positive 
changes in non-performing loans indicate an improvement in a bank’s loan portfolio 
(Nichols et al., 2009), our measure of conservatism in loan loss charge offs (NCO_CONS) 
is a binary variable used to code the difference between the lagged ratio and the median 
during the quarter, when the lagged loan loss allowance plus charge offs deflated by the 
non-performing loans is greater than the median of the previous quarter, and the lagged 
change in non-performing loans is negative.  
Finally, we use the ratio of loan loss recoveries (Compustat “llrcr”) divided by 
lagged loan charge offs (Compustat “llwocr”) to construct the measure of conservatism in 
loan loss recoveries. Loan recoveries likely relate to loan charge offs during the previous 
periods, and according to Nichols et al. (2009), more conservative banks should exhibit 
smaller recoveries. This ratio, however, during periods where the loan loss portfolio quality 
deteriorates, may reflect an earnings management practice aiming to increase temporarily 
loan loss allowance enabling in this respect the recognition of lower loan loss provisions. In 
contrast, in periods where loan loss portfolio quality improves, there is less need for such 
earnings management behavior, rendering this ratio more appropriate in capturing 
conservatism. Following this reasoning, our measure of conservatism in loan recoveries 
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(REC_CONS) is a binary variable used to code the difference between the lagged ratio and 
the median during the quarter when the lagged change in non-performing loans is negative. 
Note that we multiply the ratio by minus one, so greater values of (REC_CONS) indicate 
more conservatism in loan recoveries. 
 
3.3 Control variables 
In accordance with previous literature, we include several control variables. First, 
Hong and Stein’s (2003) model predicts that investor heterogeneity causes greater crash 
risk. Therefore, we control for investor heterogeneity using the detrended average weekly 
stock trading volume in year t-1 (DTURNt-1). We also include average firm-specific weekly 
returns (RETt-1) and volatility of firm-specific weekly returns (SIGMAt-1) over the fiscal 
year period t-1, since Chen et al. (2001) provide evidence that firms with high past returns 
and more volatile firms are more prone to crash risk. Following Hutton et al. (2009), we 
include firm-size defined as the natural logarithm of market value of equity in year t-1 
(SIZEt-1), market-to-book value of equity in year t-1 (MBt-1), financial leverage defined as 
the total liabilities to total assets in year t-1 (LEVt-1), and return-on-assets defined as income 
before extraordinary items to total assets at year t-1 (ROAt-1). Finally, we also include the 
capital ratio in year t-1 (CAPITALt-1) as the tier one risk-adjusted capital ratio and the 
bank’s deposits over total assets in year t-1 (DEPOSITSt-1).  To address concerns for 
endogeneity between past crash risk experiences and conservatism – i.e. firms which have 
experienced stock price crashes in the past improve their earnings conservatism to prevent 
such events from reoccurring – we use the lagged values for the dependent variable in our 
regressions (Harford et al., 2008).   
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4. Dataset 
 Our analysis consists of Compustat banks with available information to perform the 
analysis during the period 1995 to 2010. We focus on Bank Compustat since our crash risk 
measures require publicly traded banks. Crash risk measures are estimated using weekly 
stock returns from CRSP. Similar to prior literature, we exclude bank-year observations 
with (i) a stock price at the fiscal year-end of less than $2.5, and (ii) less than 26 weeks of 
stock returns during a fiscal year. Conservatism measures and control variables are 
calculated using information from Bank Compustat. The final sample includes 1108 banks 
with 6687 firm-year observations. 
Table 1 reports the yearly distribution of our sample during the period 1995 to 2010, 
with bank-year observations and stock price crashes estimated each year. Based on our 
definition of crashes, and assuming that firm-specific returns are normally distributed, we 
would expect to observe 0.1% of the firms crashing in any week. Accordingly, the 
likelihood of a crash would be 1 - (1 - 0.001)52 = 5.07%. From our analysis, and consistent 
with prior literature (e.g., Hutton et al., 2009, Kim and Zhang, 2015, Andreou et al., 2016a), 
it seems that crashes are more prevalent (about 15%) than what would have been expected. 
Interestingly, the frequency of crashes is independent of the market cycles, which is not 
surprising because we employ an index model to define crashes. Finally, the average 
weekly return of crashes throughout the period of investigation is substantial, and equals to 
-14.6%. Both the prevalence and the magnitude of the stock price crashes indicate that they 
constitute events with substantial consequences for market participants, especially for the 
shareholders of the affected firm, and therefore understanding the determinants of crashes 
is of paramount importance.  
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the key variables along with additional 
variables used as controls in our multivariate analysis. The mean (median) value of CRASH 
is 0.150 (0.000), suggesting that, on average, about 15% of firm-years demonstrate one or 
more firm-specific weekly returns that fall within 3.09 standard deviations below the 
annual mean. Regarding the remaining crash risk measures, the mean (median) value of 
NCSKEW is -0.146 (-0.114) and of DUVOL is -0.104 (-0.096). Despite these figures refer 
to bank-year observations, all the aforementioned crash risk statistics are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in prior studies (e.g., Kim et al., 2011, Bradshaw et al. 2010, 
Andreou et al., 2017).   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Within the income statement conservatism variables, the mean (median) value of 
NI_CONS is -0.012 (-0.002), of LLP_CONS is -0.001 (0.000), and of EBP_CONS is -0.011 
(-0.001). Regarding the balance sheet conservatism variables, the mean (median) value of 
LLA_CONS is 0.979 (0.193), of LLA_CONS_UNADJ is 1.299 (0.211), of NCO_CONS is 
0.091 (0.000), and of REC_CONS is 0.058 (0.000). Differences in mean and median figures 
of balance sheet conservatism variables indicate a skewed distribution. To avoid the 
influence of skewness we use the decile rank of each of these variables in our main 
analysis. Our main findings, however, are qualitatively similar to using the initial variables.   
As far as the control variables are concerned, our sample consists of relatively large 
banks with mean (median) SIZE values of 7.405 (7.037), with moderate growth as indicated 
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by MB ratio of 1.670 (1.548). As expected, due to the nature of their operations, banks rely 
heavily on leverage with mean LEV equal to 0.908 (median 0.912) and they are marginally 
profitable as captured by ROA mean and median values of 0.009. Finally, banks hold 
CAPITAL that equals to 0.111 (0.106) and maintain DEPOSITS that equal to 0.738 (0.752); 
notably, all these statistics are comparable to the average bank figures reported in Beatty 
and Liao (2011). More generally, our sample is fairly representative of studies that utilize 
data from the same sources. 
Table 3 presents Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients above (below) the 
diagonal among crash risk variables, accounting conservative variables, and control 
variables. The crash measures NCSKEW and DUVOL are highly correlated, since both are 
essentially measures of skewness and capture smaller and medium-sized crashes. On the 
other hand, CRASH is less correlated with the other two measures and appears to pick up a 
different dimension of crash risk as it is more sensitive to large share price falls. 
  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Overall, we observe that the crash risk measures are negatively correlated to the 
income statement accounting conservatism measures of NI_CONS, LLP_CONS and 
EBP_CONS. Largely, negative but less significant relations also exist between crash risk 
measures and balance sheet accounting conservatism measures of LLA_CONS, 
LLA_CONS_UNADJ and NCO_CONS. In contrast, REC_CONS does not exhibit a negative 
relation with crash risk measures. Overall, the evidence of inverse relation between the 
crash risk and the different conservatism measures is consistent with the predictions of our 
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first hypothesis (H1), according to which banks displaying higher conservatism in their loan 
loss accounting treatments should experience a reduction in future crash risk.  
As far as the control variable is concerned, the correlation between RET and SIGMA 
is -0.96, suggesting that they largely pose similar but opposite information content. To 
avoid multicollinearity issues in the multivariate analysis, we include only the RET. The 
remaining correlations are not sufficiently high to raise other concerns for multicollinearity.
  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Accounting conservatism channels and crash risk 
In this section we test whether accounting conservatism helps to reduce banks’ 
crash risk. Using the various net income and loan loss accounting dimensions, we examine 
the channels through which accounting conservatism impacts a bank’s future crash risk.  
We estimate the model: 
            ∑∑ +++= −−
j
ttjt
i
it CONTROLSCONSRISKCR ελαα 111_                (5) 
where CR_RISKt denotes the three different crash risk measures (CRASH, NCSKEW and 
DUVOL) calculated in year t and CONS denotes the various net income and balance sheet 
measures of conservatism, namely NI_CONS, LLP_CONS, EBP_CONS, LLA_CONS, 
LLA_CONS_UNADJ, NCO_CONS, and REC_CONS calculated in year t-1. We would 
expect the slope coefficients associated with CONS to be negative, reflecting the prediction 
in Hypothesis H1 that firms displaying accounting conservatism should experience a 
reduction in future crash risk. We include in the regressions all the control variables 
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outlined in Section 3.3 and also control for year fixed effects. The standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
Table 4 presents the results from the regressions. Columns 1-5 display the logistic 
regression marginal estimates for the crash risk variable CRASH and Columns 6 to 15 
report results from linear regressions for the crash risk variables NCSKEW and DUVOL. 
The results show that the coefficients associated with the aggregate net income measure of 
conservatism are significant for the crash measures NCSKEW and DUVOL, which capture 
smaller and medium-sized crashes. Hence, firms that exhibit a higher degree of earnings 
conservatism at the aggregate profit level are less prone to this type of crash risk. When we 
consider conservatism operating through the different components of net income, we find 
that the loan loss provision based measure of conservatism, LLP_CONS, is statistically 
significant (at a minimum level of 5%) and negative for all the crash risk variables. The 
earnings before provisions measure of conservatism, EBP_CONS, which is unaffected by 
loan provisions, is insignificant in all regressions. Hence, the decomposition of earnings 
into the two components reveals that timely recognition of loan loss provisions is the key 
discretionary component through which accounting conservatism operates in reducing 
future crash risk. Discretion in non-loan components of the income statement does not have 
any effect.2 
 
                                                          
2
 As a robustness check, we rerun the analysis separately for banks with large and small non-loan portfolios. 
The untabulated results show that conservatism operating through loan loss provisions remains significant for 
banks, independent of the size of loans on their balance sheet. In addition, the results confirm that the earnings 
before provisions measure of conservatism does not have a signaling effect on crash risk even for banks 
holding large non-loan portfolios. 
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
With regard to the balance sheet measures of conservatism, we first examine 
whether conservatism in the balance sheet recognition of loan losses, as reflected in loan 
loss allowances, predicts future crash risk. Loan loss allowances capture a series of loan 
loss provisions over past periods. Hence being more or less conservative in the current 
period is directly linked in the balance sheet measure with the level of loan loss provisions 
conservatism in previous periods. In addition, this balance sheet measure is an aggregated 
measure of conservatism which reflects the various discretionary components of banks’ 
loan loss accounting, namely loan loss provisions, net loan charge offs, and loan recoveries. 
Hence, we also test whether conservatism operating through the disaggregated components 
of net loan charge offs and loan recoveries are good predictors of crash risk. Greater 
recognition of loan loss allowances and net loan charge offs, and a slower recognition of 
loan recoveries could be associated with accounting conservatism behavior. 
The results in Table 4 show that the coefficients of the aggregated loan loss balance 
sheet variable LLA_CONS are statistically significant (at a minimum level of 5%) for crash 
risk measures, except for CRASH. When we consider the conservatism measure of loan loss 
allowances before the treatment of net loan charge offs and loan recoveries 
(LLA_CONS_UNADJ) simultaneously with the measures of net loan charge offs 
(NCO_CONS) and loan recoveries (REC_CONS), we find that conservatism in loan loss 
allowances remains significant jointly with LLP_CONS, while there is little evidence for 
conservatism operating through net loan charge offs and loan recoveries (with only the 
CRASH measure significant at 10% level). So disaggregating the income statement and 
28 
 
balance sheet measures of conservatism reveals that the main dimensions through which 
accounting conservatism operates in reducing future crash risk is the discretionary channel 
of loan loss provisions as well as the aggregate treatment of loan loss allowances.  
To assess the impact of conservatism for crash risk, we estimate the realized 
economic significance in terms of likelihood reduction in crash risk. Specifically, we 
calculate the CRASH logit function for LLP_CONS at its 90th and the 10th percentile values 
and find that banks increasing their conservatism in loan loss provisions from the 10th to the 
90th percentile decrease their probability of crash risk by 14.2%. Additionally, for NSKEW 
and DUVOL, we measure the percentage standard deviations of the crash variable that is 
explained with a one-standard deviation change in the conservatism variables. Considering 
the full model in Table 4 (Columns 10 and 15), we find that a one standard deviation 
increase in LLP_CONS decreases NCSKEW (DUVOL) by 0.030 (0.032) standard 
deviations, while a standard deviation increase in LLA_CONS decreases NCSKEW 
(DUVOL) by 0.029 (0.029). 
In summary, the results confirm H1 that accounting conservatism has a significant 
impact in reducing future crash risks among banks and the main channels through which 
accounting conservatism operates in reducing future crash risk are the discretionary 
channels of loan loss provisions in the income statement and the aggregate treatment of 
loan loss allowances. 
While our interpretation of the findings is more plausible (Watts, 2003), earnings 
management could also produce some evidence consistent with conservatism. Along this 
line, Cohen et al (2014) show that banks engaging in earnings management practices 
increase their exposure to crash risk, especially during the recent financial crisis. Hence, to 
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preclude earnings management as an explanation of our findings, we test further whether 
the relations remain robust after controlling for earnings management. We expect that, 
while effects of earnings management on crash risk will be pronounced during crisis 
periods, conservatism predicts crash risk more generally and not only during crises periods. 
This is due to the nature of conservatism that relates more to persistent conservative 
reporting culture that a bank adopts, rather than a transient earnings smoothing mechanism 
(Watts, 2003). To test this, we use the earnings management variable LLP_MGT of Cohen 
et al (2014), which is available for most part of our wider sample.3 Table 5 shows the 
results of a regression analysis of the measures of crash risk on lagged LLP_CONS, lagged 
LLA_CONS_UNADJ, lagged LLP_MGT, and the interaction of these with a dummy 
variable for the recent crisis.4 Consistent with Cohen et al (2014), the relationship between 
LLP_MGT and crash risk is seen only in the crisis period and with highest (but marginal) 
significance for the CRASH variable. In contrast, the relationship between conditional 
conservatism and crash risk is seen for the other two crash variables with high significance 
and does not depend on the crisis periods. This confirms the conjecture that earnings 
management is picking up different information, particularly more transitory exposure to 
large crashes, whereas conservatism reflects more persistent accounting behavior that 
affects crash risk more generally.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
                                                          
3
 We thank the authors for kindly providing us with their LLP_MGT measure of earnings management. 
4
 When using a logit regression, the interpretation of interaction term coefficients could be misleading. Thus, 
we follow Fiordelisi and Ricci (2013) and use the methodology developed by Ai and Norton (2003) and 
Norton et al., (2004) to compute correct marginal estimates and their standard errors. 
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5.2 Conservatism, banking lending growth cycle and crash risk 
In this section, we test whether the effect of conservatism on future stock price 
crash risk varies at different states of the bank lending growth cycle. Since loan loss 
provisions and loan loss allowances constitute the main channels through which accounting 
conservatism operates in reducing crash risk, we use the LLP_CONS and 
LLA_CONS_UNADJ measures of conservatism for the rest of our analyses. We proxy 
banking lending growth cycles using the macroeconomic variable “Commercial and 
industrial loans outstanding plus non-fin commercial paper (FCLNBW)” compiled by The 
Conference Board, which measures the volume of business loans held by banks and 
commercial papers issued by nonfinancial companies. Commercial and industrial loans 
represent a major line of business for the banking industry and also act as an important 
source of funding for the business sector. FCLNBW provides an indication of the lending 
activity of the banking sector to the business sector. We use the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) 
filter to obtain an estimate of a flexible trend of the growth in FCLNBW. We then classify 
the period of investigation into terciles, reflecting the three states of the lending growth 
cycle (high, moderate, and low), based on the difference between the growth rates in 
FCLNBW and the growth rates of the FCLNBW according to the flexible trend.  
To investigate the relationship between accounting conservatism and crash risk 
under the different states of the lending growth cycle, we employ the following model: 
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where CONS corresponds to the conservatism measures, LLP_CONS and 
LLA_CONS_UNADJ, and HIGH_CYCLE, MODERATE_CYCLE and LOW_CYCLE 
corresponds to binary variables that capture the high, moderate and low lending growth 
cycles, respectively. The high lending cycle variable is equal to one for years 2000, 2005-
2008, and zero otherwise; the moderate lending cycle variable is equal to one for years 
1994-1999, and zero otherwise; and the low lending cycle variable is equal to one for years 
2001-2004 and 2009, and zero otherwise. High, moderate and low lending cycles exhibit on 
average 13.5%, 7.4% and -11.8% growths in lending, respectively. The test results are 
reported in Table 6. In line with Hypothesis H2, we find that the coefficients associated 
with LLP_CONS during the high and low states of the lending growth cycles are all 
negative and significant in almost all cases (except once for the CRASH measure during the 
high cycle period). LLA_CONS_UNADJ that reflects conservatism in the loan loss 
allowance items shows significant relations to crash risk during the high lending growth 
cycle. The results indicate that accounting conservatism among banks helps significantly 
reduce future crash risks at the extremes of the lending growth cycle, that is, during credit 
crunch and credit boom times. At the high stage of the cycle, more conservative banks 
seem to benefit from a reduction in future stock price crashes, perhaps because conservative 
banks do not over-lend at such times and avoid making bad quality loans (Beatty and Liao, 
2011). Similarly, at the low stage of the cycle, more conservative banks benefit from a 
more prudent representation of the quality of their loan portfolios that are particularly 
sensitive during credit crunch periods. Generally, the impact of conservatism on future 
crash risk is more pronounced during low business cycle periods, as seen by the stronger 
significance (at 1% level) of the slope coefficients for LLP_CONS during the low states of 
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the business cycle. Thus, although non-conservative banks are more prudent in their 
lending behavior during periods of credit crunch (as noted by Beatty and Liao, 2011), the 
extra prudence of the more conservative banks has a greater incremental effect on crash risk 
at these times. During moderate times, the effect of accounting conservatism is 
insignificant.  
[Insert Table 6 about here]
 
 
 
5.3 Conservatism, information opacity, bank size and crash risk 
In this section, we study the impact of conservatism on crash risk for banks with different 
levels of information opacity (proxied by dispersion among analyst forecasts) and for small 
and large banks. Under Hypotheses H3 and H4 we predict that the relationship between 
conservatism and the reduction in future crash risks will be more pronounced for banks 
with higher dispersion in analyst forecasts, and for smaller banks. 
We test these predictions by considering Equation (6) for banks classified according 
to forecast dispersion and size.5  Specifically, a bank is considered to have high (low) 
opaqueness when the analysts’ forecast dispersion is above (below) the median of the year.6 
Similarly, we classify large (small) banks as those with above (below) $1 billion in total 
assets, consistent with previous studies (e.g., Andreou et al., 2016b). We report the results 
in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. Consistent with H3, Table 7 shows that the relationship 
                                                          
5
 We also measure information opacity by classifying banks with and without analyst forecasts, and the 
(unreported) empirical results are similar to the reported results for the forecast dispersion measure.  
6
 Some firms in our sample have missing values for analyst forecasts or have a single analyst forecast. In such 
cases, we are unable to calculate the dispersion measure and we classify such firms as high dispersion firms in 
our regressions. The results remain unchanged if we remove such firms from our regressions. 
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between conservatism and crash risk is only significant for banks with high forecast 
dispersion and much more prevalent in the extreme cycles (Panel A). Similarly, Table 8 
shows that the relationship is stronger for smaller banks, although the difference between 
large and small banks is not as pronounced as the difference between banks with high and 
low forecast dispersion. For the case of small banks, consistent with Hypothesis H4, we 
observe that accounting conservatism in loan loss accounting items, both provisions and 
allowances, are significantly associated with a decrease in large stock prices crashes, with 
LLP_CONS and LLA_CONS_UNADJ coefficients being significant for various crash risk 
measures. Further, for small banks, we find that conservatism also helps reduce the 
occurrence of future price crashes during the extreme periods, with the effect of 
LLP_CONS pronounced during the credit crunch state of the lending growth cycle, while 
LLA_CONS_UNADJ effect is significantly observed during the credit boom state of the 
lending growth cycle.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Interestingly, Table 8 Panel B shows that for large banks there is no relationship 
between crash risk and accounting conservatism. In particular, the conservatism 
coefficients, although negative, are mostly insignificant for all measures of crash risk and at 
all states of the credit cycle. In addition, the results show different exposure of large and 
small banks to crash risk at different states of the bank lending growth cycle. For example, 
regardless of their conservatism, large banks generally have significantly higher crash risk 
at the high part of the lending growth cycle, while small banks show enhanced 
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unconditional link between crash risk and the low lending growth cycle. However, 
conservatism does not seem to matter during moderate cycles.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Due to the importance of the finding that large banks show no link between 
conservatism and crash risk, we further investigate the relationship between accounting 
conservatism and crash risk using the subsample of large banks that have high analyst 
forecast dispersion. Untabulated results indicate no systematic relationship between crash 
risk and conservatism, confirming that the general result of no relation between 
conservatism and crash risk for large banks holds, even within the subset of large banks that 
have high information opacity. 
To summarize, since the most important regulatory concern is the risk of the 
banking system, it is the crash risk of large banks that is of main interest for regulators. 
Therefore any difference in the effect of conservatism on crash risk between large and 
small banks is important in assessing the regulatory implications of accounting 
conservatism. Our results show that there is no effect of conservatism on crash risk among 
large banks, regardless of the level of information asymmetry. This is consistent with 
models where the managers of large banks with publicly traded equity have a stronger 
incentive to be conservative (see Watts, 2003; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Nichols et al., 
2009).  
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5.4 Additional Analysis – growth in liquidity cycles, growth in aggregate financial 
sector risk and crash risk 
The results so far suggest that the cyclical variation in crash risk and the effect of 
conservatism on crash risk is influenced by the banking business cycle as measured by the 
growth in bank lending activity. As an additional analysis, we test for the relationship using 
alternative banking business cycles that affects the lending portfolio quality. In particular, 
we test whether the effect of conservatism on crash risk varies according to the market 
liquidity growth cycles, proxied by monetary base (M1) activity, and the growth in the 
aggregate financial sector risk using the CATFIN measure developed by Allen et al. (2012).  
Similar to the banking lending growth cycles, we construct high, moderate and low periods 
based on growth in market liquidity and growth in the aggregate financial sector risk. 
The test results are reported in Tables 9 and 10, respectively. We see that the overall 
crash risk is significantly increased during the high liquidity growth cycle and periods of 
high aggregate growth in financial sector risk. Interestingly, we observe that the relations 
between conservatism and crash risk are pronounced during the periods of extremes, that is, 
mainly during the low liquidity growth cycle and periods of heightened aggregate growth in 
financial sector risk. This can be explained by the fact that conservatism in loan loss 
accounting relates to the quality of loan portfolios, which is in turn driven by the broader 
market conditions. Further, the results using growth in market liquidity and growth in the 
aggregate financial sector systemic risk measures confirm our previous findings that during 
moderate periods, the effect of conservatism on crash risk is non-existent.  
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[Insert Table 9 and 10 about here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper documents a significant link between conditional conservatism and 
banks’ future crash risk. The key channels of influence from conservatism to crash risk are 
the discretionary treatments of loan loss provisions in the income statement and loan loss 
allowances in the balance sheet. This effect is persistent and different from the transient 
relationship between earnings management and crash risk that holds mainly during crisis 
periods.  
The impact of conservatism on crash risk is magnified during the low state of the 
lending growth cycle (credit crunch periods), with some increased effect also during the 
high state of the lending growth cycle (credit boom periods). Conservatism does not matter 
during moderate business cycles that correspond to “business-as-usual” periods. Further, 
for small banks the effect of conservatism on crash risk is closely related to bank 
opaqueness, measured by the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. More opaque small banks 
show a stronger relationship. Small banks can significantly reduce future crash risk by 
maintaining conservative accounting, especially during low lending periods. However, 
consistent with theories which state that large banks with publicly traded equity have a 
private incentive to be conservative, we find no relationship between conservatism and 
crash risk for large banks, even opaque ones. Although we observe that the crash risk of 
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large banks is highest in the boom periods of the lending growth cycle, this effect is 
unrelated to conservatism.  
These results contribute to the policy debate on bank accounting and bank 
regulation. They are consistent with the view that the private incentives of large banks to 
adopt conservative accounting practices result in very little possibility for using the 
regulation of accounting conservatism to control the crash risk of large banks. Since large 
banks are the main source of systemic risk, these results indicate that there is limited scope 
for controlling systemic risk by regulating the behavior that is captured by the conditional 
conservatism measure of accounting behavior.  
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Appendix: Definition of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent Variables:  
CRASH An indicator variable that is equal to one when a 
firm experiences at least one crash week during 
the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
NCSKEW Negative of the third moment of firm-specific 
weekly returns for each firm and year divided by 
the standard deviation of bank-specific weekly 
returns raised to the third power. 
DUVOL Log of the ratio of the standard deviation of the 
“down weeks” over the standard deviation of the 
“up weeks”. 
Independent Variables:  
NI_CONS Conservatism measure computed by cumulating 
Basu’s (1997) net income conservatism measure 
over the previous three-year period. 
LLP_CONS Conservatism measure computed by cumulating 
Basu’s (1997) loan loss provisions conservatism 
measure over the previous three-year period. 
EBP_CONS Conservatism measure computed by cumulating 
Basu’s (1997) earnings before provisions 
conservatism measure over the previous three-
year period. 
LLA_CONS Balance sheet conservatism measure computed as 
the decile rank of the difference between the 
lagged ratio and the median during the quarter 
ratio of the allowance of loan loss provisions 
divided by the non-performing loans. 
LLA_CONS_UNADJ Balance sheet conservatism measure computed as 
the decile rank of the difference between the 
lagged ratio and the median during the quarter 
ratio of the unadjusted loan loss allowance, which 
is computed as the loan loss allowances plus loan 
charge offs minus loan loss recoveries divided by 
the non-performing loans. 
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NCO_CONS Conservatism in loan loss charge offs coded with 
a binary variable to capture the difference 
between the lagged ratio and the median during 
the quarter, when the lagged loan loss allowance 
plus charge offs deflated by the non-performing 
loans is greater than the median of the previous 
quarter and the lagged change in non-performing 
loans is negative. Loan loss charge offs is the ratio 
of loan charge offs divided by the non-performing 
loans.  
REC_CONS Conservatism in loan recoveries coded with a 
binary variable to capture the difference between 
the lagged ratio of loan loss recoveries and the 
median during the quarter, when the lagged 
change in non-performing loans is negative. The 
ratio is computed as loan loss recoveries divided 
by lagged loan charge offs. 
DTURN Detrended average weekly stock trading volume. 
RET Average firm-specific weekly returns during the 
fiscal year. 
SIGMA Volatility of firm-specific weekly returns during 
the fiscal year. 
SIZE Firm-size defined as the natural logarithm of 
market value of equity. 
MB Market-to-book value of equity. 
LEV Financial leverage defined as the total liabilities to 
total assets. 
ROA Return-on-assets defined as income before 
extraordinary items to total assets. 
CAPITAL Capital ratio computed as the tier one risk-
adjusted capital ratio.  
DEPOSITS Deposits over total assets. 
 
45 
 
Table 1: Distribution of bank-year observations and stock price crashes 
This table presents information regarding the distribution of firm-year observations and stock price crashes. The sample 
consists of 6687 bank firm-year observations during the period 1995-2010. Banks are defined using the following SIC 
codes: 6020, 6022, 6035 and 6036. 
Year Number of Observations 
Number of Banks 
With No Crashes 
Number of Banks 
Experiencing 
Crashes 
Percentage of 
Crashes 
Average Returns 
during Crashes 
1995 114 99 15 0.132 -0.108  
1996 287 263 24 0.084  -0.096 
1997 488 462 26 0.053 -0.106  
1998 473 410 63 0.133  -0.149 
1999 460 370 90 0.196  -0.140 
2000 444 376 68 0.153  -0.166 
2001 464 392 72 0.155  -0.133 
2002 518 428 90 0.174  -0.126 
2003 502 430 72 0.143  -0.098 
2004 442 375 67 0.152  -0.100 
2005 413 354 59 0.143  -0.116 
2006 425 364 61 0.144  -0.083 
2007 458 371 87 0.190  -0.149 
2008 421 353 68 0.162  -0.234 
2009 390 313 77 0.197  -0.247 
2010 388 327 61 0.157  -0.184 
Total 6687 5687 1000 0.150  -0.146 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the main variables. The sample consists of 6687 bank firm-year observations 
during the period 1995-2010. Banks are defined using the following SIC codes: 6020, 6022, 6035 and 6036. All variables 
are described in the Appendix. 
Variables Mean Median Std Dev. 25th Percentile 75th Percentile  
Dependent Variables 
CRASHt 0.150 0.000 0.357 0.000 0.000 
NCSKEWt -0.146 -0.114 0.753 -0.529 0.260 
DUVOLt -0.104 -0.096 0.344 -0.319 0.113 
Conservatism Variables 
NI_CONSt-1 -0.012 -0.002 0.185 -0.079 0.059 
LLP_CONSt-1 -0.001 0.000 0.009 -0.004 0.004 
EBP_CONSt-1 -0.011 -0.001 0.077 -0.039 0.028 
LLA_CONSt-1 0.979 0.193 2.418 -0.560 1.399 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1  1.299 0.211 4.174 -0.591 1.493 
NCO_CONSt-1  0.091 0.000 1.453 0.000 0.000 
REC_CONSt-1  0.058 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.000 
Control Variables 
DTURNt-1 0.902 0.193 6.182 -1.266 2.069 
RETt-1 -0.076 -0.049 0.084 -0.088 -0.029 
SIGMAt-1 0.036 0.031 0.017 0.024 0.042 
SIZEt-1 7.405 7.037 1.700 6.212 8.229 
MBt-1 1.670 1.548 0.748 1.140 2.073 
LEVt-1 0.908 0.912 0.028 0.897 0.925 
ROAt-1 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.012 
CAPITALt-1 0.111 0.106 0.033 0.088 0.128 
DEPOSITSt-1 0.738 0.752 0.104 0.673 0.819 
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Table 3: Pearson (Spearman) correlation above (below) the diagonal among crash risk and conservatism variables 
This table presents Pearson/Spearman correlation coefficients among the main variables. The sample consists of 6687 bank firm year-observations during the period 1995-2010. Banks are 
defined using the following SIC codes: 6020, 6022, 6035 and 6036. All variables are described in the Appendix. The significance is designated by *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Dependent Variables                    
1. CRASHt 1.00 0.51 *** 0.48 *** 0.00 -0.03** 0.02 * -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
 ***
 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
2. NCSKEWt 0.50 *** 1.00 0.95*** -0.08 *** -0.06*** -0.08 *** 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05
***
 0.06*** -0.04*** 0.05*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.02 -0.01 -0.04*** -0.08 *** 
3. DUVOLt 0.46 *** 0.98 *** 1.00 -0.09 *** -0.06 ** -0.09 *** 0.00 0.01 0.02
 **
 0.06*** 0.04 *** -0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.13*** 0.11 *** 0.01 0.01 -0.04 *** -0.09 *** 
 
      
    
         
Conservatism Variables                   
4. NI_CONS
 t-1 0.01 -0.09 *** -0.09 *** 1.00 -0.21 *** 0.38 *** -0.13
 ***
 -0.17 *** -0.25 *** -0.37 *** 
-0.11 *** -0.19 *** 0.18 *** -0.48 *** -0.25 *** 0.01 -0.20 *** 0.13 *** 0.22 *** 
5. LLP_CONSt-1 -0.02 -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.23
 ***
 1.00 0.02 0.02
 *
 -0.01 -0.04 *** -0.17 *** 
-0.08 *** 0.04 *** -0.02 ** -0.24 *** -0.08 *** -0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.02 * 0.13 *** 
6. EBP_CONSt-1 0.02 -0.10 *** -0.09 *** 0.61
 ***
 
-0.02 * 1.00 -0.19
 ***
 -0.24 *** -0.33 *** -0.47 *** 
-0.09 *** -0.11 *** 0.13 *** -0.64 *** -0.55 *** -0.08 *** -0.27 *** 0.13 *** 0.14 *** 
7. LLA_CONSt-1 -0,02 0,00 0,00 -0,13 *** 0,04 *** -0,20 *** 1.00 0.93 *** 0.18 *** 0.16 *** 0.04 *** 0.08 *** -0.08 *** 0.14 *** 0.24 *** -0.03 ** 0.16 *** 0.08 *** 0.05 *** 
8. LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1  -0,02 0,00 0,01 -0,16 *** 0,02 -0,24 *** 0,93 *** 1.00 0.23 *** 0.24 *** 0.05 *** 0.08 *** -0.09 *** 0.20 *** 0.27 *** -0.01 0.17 *** 0.06 *** 0.03 ** 
9. NCO_CONSt-1  -0,03 0,02 0,02 ** -0,26 *** -0,01 -0,30 *** 0,18 *** 0,23 *** 1.00 0.60 *** 0.02 0.12 *** -0.15 *** 0.40 *** 0.22 *** 0.08 *** 0.14 *** -0.05 *** -0.06 *** 
10. REC_CONSt-1  -0,01 0,05 *** 0,06 *** -0,38 *** -0,14 *** -0,45 *** 0,16 *** 0,24 0,60 1.00 0.12 *** 0.09 *** -0.12 *** 0.64 *** 0.31 *** 0.10 *** 0.15 *** -0.08 *** -0.13 *** 
 
   
 
               
Control Variables                    
11. DTURNt-1 0.01 0.06 *** 0.05 *** -0.10
 ***
 
-0.07 *** -0.16 *** 0,06
 ***
 0,07 *** 0,03 *** 0,11 1.00 -0.21 *** 0.21 *** 0.24 *** 0.03 ** -0.03 ** -0.09 *** 0.01 -0.09 *** 
12. RETt-1 -0.01 -0.05 *** -0.03 *** -0.14
 ***
 0.01 -0.10 *** 0,07
 ***
 0,08 *** 0,19 *** 0,16 
-0.15 *** 1.00 -0.96 *** 0.03 ** 0.29 *** -0.05 *** 0.44 *** 0.02 * -0.02 
13. SIGMAt-1 0.01 0.06 *** 0.04 *** -0.13
 ***
 
-0.01 0.10 *** -0,07
 ***
 -0,08 *** -0,18 *** -0,16 0.15 *** -0.99 *** 1.00 -0.06 *** -0.28 *** 0.07 *** -0.41 *** -0.03 *** 0.03 ** 
14. SIZEt-1 -0.02 0.12 *** 0.12 *** -0.55
 ***
 
-0.20 *** -0.68 *** 0,14
 ***
 0,19 *** 0,35 *** 0,54 0.21 *** 0.07 *** -0.07 *** 1.00 0.35 *** 0.21 *** 0.10 *** -0.21 *** -0.35 *** 
15. MBt-1 0.00 0.09 *** 0.10 *** -0.29
 ***
 
-0.05 *** -0.55 *** 0,24
 ***
 0,27 *** 0,21 *** 0,29 0.11 *** 0.24 *** -0.24 *** 0.38 *** 1.00 0.19 *** 0.44 *** 0.00 0.05 *** 
16. LEVt-1 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0,03
 ***
 -0,03 ** 0,07 *** 0,08 
-0.01 -0.08 *** 0.08 *** 0.19 *** 0.18 *** 1.00 -0.12 *** -0.55 *** 0.02 
17. ROAt-1 -0.03 ** 0.01 0.02 -0.21
 ***
 0.03 ** -0.41 *** 0,23
 ***
 0,24 *** 0,20 *** 0,24 0.03 *** 0.27 *** -0.27 *** 0.20 *** 0.60 *** -0.20 *** 1.00 0.16 *** 0.03 ** 
18. CAPITALt-1 -0.01 -0.04 *** -0.04 *** 0.18
 ***
 
-0.02 * 0.10 *** 0,09
 ***
 0,07 *** -0,05 *** -0,07 0.02 * 0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.16 *** 0.04 *** -0.49 *** 0.22 *** 1.00 0.16 *** 
19. DEPOSITSt-1 -0.02 * -0.09 *** -0.09 *** 0.24
 ***
 0.07 *** 0.15 *** 0,04
 ***
 0,01 -0,07 *** -0,15 
-0.03 ** -0.05 *** 0.05 *** -0.30 *** 0.07 *** -0.05 *** 0.10 *** 0.23 *** 1.00 
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Table 4: Income statement and balance sheet measures of accounting conservatism and crash risk 
This table reports estimates of the relation between income statement and balance sheet measures of conservatism on crash risk. Models (1)-(5) display logistic regression marginal estimates 
while models (6)-(15) report linear regression coefficient estimates. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The sample consists of 6687 bank firm year-observations (N) 
during the period 1995-2010. Banks are defined using the following SIC codes: 6020, 6022, 6035 and 6036. All regressions include intercepts and year fixed effects. All variables are described 
in the Appendix. z- / t-statistic is in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The significance is designated by *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  
 
 Predicted 
sign 
CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
NI_CONSt-1 
- 0.018 
(0.55)     
-0.123* 
(-1.72)     
-0.087*** 
(-2.65)     
LLP_CONSt-1 - 
 
-1.110*** 
(-2.80)   
-1.067*** 
(-2.74)  
-2.206** 
(-2.48)   
-2.174** 
(-2.45)  
-1.061** 
(-2.54)   
-1.050** 
(-2.51) 
EBP_CONSt-1 - 
 
0.089 
(0.78)   
0.082 
(0.72)  
0.322 
(1.34)   
0.313 
(1.31)  
0.105 
(0.95)   
0.104 
(0.95) 
LLA_CONSt-1 -   
-0.015 
(-1.55)     
-0.047** 
(-2.53)     
-0.023*** 
(-2.71)   
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 -    
-0.012 
(-1.22) 
-0.012 
(-1.19)    
-0.044** 
(-2.31) 
-0.044** 
(-2.28)    
-0.020** 
(-2.35) 
-0.020** 
(-2.30) 
NCO_CONSt-1 -    
-0.039* 
(-1.67) 
-0.036 
(-1.52)    
-0.034 
(-0.79) 
-0.023 
(-0.54)    
-0.004 
(-0.23) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
REC_CONSt-1 -    
0.030* 
(1.71) 
0.026 
(1.49)    
-0.025 
(-0.67) 
-0.031 
(-0.86)    
-0.07 
(-0.41) 
-0.010 
(-0.61) 
                 
Control variables  
               
DTURNt-1 + 0.000 
(0.18) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
0.000 
(0.18) 
0.000 
(0.11) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.000 
(-0.00) 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
0.000 
(0.11) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.73) 
-0.000 
(-0.71) 
-0.000 
(-0.58) 
-0.000 
(-0.60) 
-0.000 
(-0.69) 
RETt-1 + 0.061 
(0.88) 
0.065 
(0.96) 
0.060 
(0.88) 
0.056 
(0.83) 
0.068 
(1.01) 
-0.283* 
(-1.88) 
-0.212 
(-1.42) 
-0.212 
(-1.43) 
-0.207 
(-1.40) 
-0.185 
(-1.24) 
-0.127* 
(-1.95) 
-0.082 
(-1.26) 
-0.083 
(-1.29) 
-0.083 
(-1.29) 
-0.072 
(-1.10) 
SIZEt-1 - -0.008** 
(-2.22) 
-0.009** 
(-2.21) 
-0.009** 
(-2.45) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.58) 
-0.011** 
(-2.31) 
0.024*** 
(3.02) 
0.032*** 
(3.52) 
0.030*** 
(4.21) 
0.036*** 
(4.42) 
0.039*** 
(3.93) 
0.009*** 
(2.78) 
0.014*** 
(3.35) 
0.014*** 
(4.29) 
0.015*** 
(4.23) 
0.016*** 
(3.57) 
MBt-1 + 0.017** 
(2.31) 
0.020** 
(2.39) 
0.019*** 
(2.59) 
0.019** 
(2.50) 
0.022*** 
(2.57) 
0.107*** 
(6.33) 
0.123*** 
(6.29) 
0.118*** 
(6.89) 
0.119*** 
(6.92) 
0.132*** 
(6.59) 
0.049*** 
(6.17) 
0.055*** 
(6.04) 
0.055*** 
(6.87) 
0.054*** 
(6.81) 
0.059*** 
(6.34) 
LEVt-1 - -0.387** 
(-2.05) 
-0.404** 
(-2.18) 
-0.381** 
(-2.05) 
-0.374** 
(-2.01) 
-0.407** 
(-2.19) 
-0.725* 
(-1.80) 
-0.987** 
(-2.40) 
-0.882** 
(-2.23) 
-0.916** 
(-2.32) 
-1.053** 
(-2.57) 
-0.346* 
(-1.92) 
-0.479*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.448** 
(-2.53) 
-0.455** 
(-2.57) 
-0.503*** 
(-2.73) 
ROAt-1 - -0.523 
(-0.81) 
-0.351 
(-0.53) 
-0.502 
(-0.77) 
-0.506 
(-0.78) 
-0.319 
(-0.48) 
-2.321 
(-1.61) 
-1.646 
(-1.15) 
-1.965 
(-1.37) 
-1.958 
(-1.37) 
-1.478 
(-1.03) 
-0.781 
(-1.16) 
-0.445 
(-0.66) 
-0.570 
(-0.84) 
-0.576 
(-0.85) 
-0.371 
(-0.55) 
CAPITALt-1 - -0.380** 
(-2.27) 
-0.411** 
(-2.48) 
-0.358** 
(-2.18) 
-0.370** 
(-2.23) 
-0.410** 
(-2.47) 
-0.640* 
(-1.85) 
-0.858** 
(-2.42) 
-0.693** 
(-2.01) 
-0.695** 
(-2.02) 
-0.821** 
(-2.33) 
-0.273* 
(-1.80) 
-0.385** 
(-2.48) 
-0.318** 
(-2.09) 
-0.319** 
(-2.11) 
-0.369** 
(-2.38) 
DEPOSITSt-1 - -0.055 
(-1.17) 
-0.046 
(-0.97) 
-0.049 
(-1.03) 
-0.053 
(-1.11) 
-0.045 
(-0.95) 
-0.269*** 
(-2.82) 
0.257*** 
(2.69) 
-0.263*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.252*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.232** 
(-2.43) 
-0.126*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.123*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.124*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.122*** 
(-2.90) 
-0.114*** 
(-2.69) 
DEPENDENTt-1 ? 0.006 
(0.93) 
0.006 
(0.90) 
0.006 
(0.91) 
0.006 
(0.93) 
0.006 
(0.90) 
0.026* 
(1.95) 
0.026** 
(1.99) 
0.026* 
(1.94) 
0.026** 
(1.97) 
0.026** 
(1.99) 
0.034*** 
(2.63) 
0.034*** 
(2.67) 
0.033*** 
(2.64) 
0.034*** 
(2.67) 
0.034*** 
(2.67) 
N  6687 6687 6687 6687 6687 6687 6687 6687 6687 6687 6687 6687 6687 6687 6687 
Pseudo/ Adj. R2  0.017 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.064 
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Table 5: Income statement and balance sheet measures of accounting conservatism and crash risk: The impact of earnings management 
This table reports estimates of the relation between income statement and balance sheet measures of conservatism, and earnings management on crash risk. Models (1)-(3) display logistic 
regression marginal estimates, with margins for interaction terms calculated as shown in Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton, Wang and Ai (2004). Models (4)-(12) report linear regression 
coefficient estimates. The earnings management variable (LLP_MGT) is defined as in Cohen et al (2014). All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The sample consists of 
3471 bank firm year-observations (N) during the period 1997-2009. Banks are defined using the following SIC codes: 6020, 6022, 6035 and 6036. All regressions include intercepts and year 
fixed effects. All variables are described in the Appendix. z- / t-statistic is in parentheses below the coefficient estimate. The significance is designated by *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  
 Predicted 
sign 
CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
LLP_CONSt-1 - 
-0.937 
(1.20)  
-0.881 
(1.09) 
-5.967*** 
(-3.31)  
-5.785*** 
(-3.22) 
-3.034*** 
(-3.74)  
-2.967*** 
(-3.67) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * CRISIS ? 
3.413 
(0.78)  
3.544 
(0.79) 
-0.602 
(-0.10)  
-1.094 
(-0.17) 
0.748 
(0.29)  
0.518 
(0.20) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1  -  
-0.021 
(1.48) 
-0.020 
(1.41)  
-0.073** 
(-.255) 
-0.071** 
(-2.48)  
-0.028** 
(-2.24) 
-0.027** 
(-2.14) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * CRISIS -  
-0.023 
(-0.38) 
-0.027 
(-.045)  
0.0156 
(0.22) 
0.027 
(0.37)  
0.011 
(0.31) 
0.014 
(0.41) 
LLP_MGTt-1 + 
0.553 
(0.40) 
0.564 
(0.41) 
0.338 
(0.24) 
-0.111 
(-0.04) 
0.204 
(0.07) 
-0.872 
(-0.31) 
-0.295 
(-0.23) 
-0.015 
(-0.01) 
-0.585 
(-0.45) 
LLP_MGTt-1 * CRISIS + 
15.497* 
(2.11) 
13.928* 
(1.84) 
14.776* 
(1.94) 
16.859* 
(1.78) 
16.476* 
(1.78) 
16.671* 
(1.76) 
7.422 
(1.63) 
7.099 
(1.61) 
7.450* 
(1.66) 
           
Control variables           
CRISIS + 0.136** (2.29) 
0.152** 
(2.41) 
0.144** 
(2.17) 
0.179* 
(1.91) 
0.160 
(1.61) 
0.183* 
(1.75) 
0.056 
(1.27) 
0.047 
(0.98) 
0.055 
(1.11) 
DTURNt-1 + 
0.000 
(0.12) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
0.000 
(0.13) 
-0.003 
(-0.88) 
-0.003 
(-1.02) 
-0.003 
(-0.89) 
-0.001 
(-1.13) 
-0.002 
(-1.33) 
-0.001 
(-1.15) 
RETt-1 + 
0.254* 
(1.70) 
0.268* 
(1.82) 
0.261* 
(1.75) 
-0.491* 
(-1.87) 
-0.511** 
(-1.99) 
-0.469* 
(-1.78) 
-0.208* 
(-1.66) 
-0.218* 
(-1.75) 
-0.200 
(-1.58) 
SIZEt-1 - 
-0.002 
(0.38) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.27) 
0.036*** 
(3.13) 
0.048*** 
(4.42) 
0.038*** 
(3.32) 
0.0186*** 
(3.52) 
0.024*** 
(4.89) 
0.0193*** 
(3.66) 
MBt-1 + 
0.020* 
(1.76) 
0.025** 
(2.29) 
0.023** 
(2.09) 
0.106*** 
(4.59) 
0.119*** 
(5.17) 
0.119*** 
(5.02) 
0.046*** 
(4.25) 
0.051*** 
(4.83) 
0.050*** 
(4.62) 
LEVt-1 - 
-0.688* 
(1.81) 
-0.729* 
(1.93) 
-0.740* 
(1.94) 
-1.300* 
(-1.72) 
-1.599** 
(-2.13) 
-1.438* 
(-1.92) 
-0.549 
(-1.56) 
-0.668* 
(-1.91) 
-0.599* 
(-1.70) 
ROAt-1 - 
-1.152 
(0.80) 
-1.113 
(0.76) 
-1.137 
(0.79) 
1.287 
(0.46) 
0.579 
(0.20) 
1.388 
(0.50) 
1.263 
(0.96) 
0.937 
(0.71) 
1.306 
(1.00) 
CAPITALt-1 - 
-0.278 
(1.06) 
-0.259 
(1.01) 
-0.281 
(1.08) 
-0.414 
(-0.84) 
-0.426 
(-0.88) 
-0.418 
(-0.86) 
-0.021 
(-0.09) 
-0.019 
(-0.09) 
-0.022 
(-0.10) 
DEPOSITSt-1 - 
0.028 
(0.39) 
0.034 
(0.48) 
0.035 
(0.49) 
-0.119 
(-0.83) 
-0.147 
(-1.02) 
-0.094 
(-0.66) 
-0.057 
(-0.92) 
-0.074 
(-1.16) 
-0.049 
(-0.77) 
DEPENDENTt-1 ? 
0.007 
(0.70) 
0.007 
(0.76) 
0.006 
(0.67) 
0.018 
(1.08) 
0.022 
(1.22) 
0.018 
(1.04) 
0.030* 
(1.80) 
0.034** 
(1.98) 
0.030* 
(1.77) 
N  3471 3471 3471 3471 3471 3471 3471 3471 3471 
Pseudo/Adj. R2  0.0194 0.0199 0.0204 0.055 0.054 0.056 0.065 0.062 0.066 
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Table 6: Accounting conservatism, lending growth cycles and crash risk 
This table reports estimates of the relation between conservatism on crash risk conditional on banking cycle. As a proxy for 
the banking cycle we use growth in lending as captured by the change in macroeconomic variable “Commercial and 
industrial loans outstanding plus non-fin commercial paper (FCLNBW)” compiled by The Conference Board, which 
measures the volume of business loans held by banks and commercial papers issued by nonfinancial companies. Then, we 
use the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter to obtain an estimate of a flexible trend of the change in FCLNBW. The parameter λ 
takes the value of 100. Finally, we classify the period of investigation into three sub-periods (High, Moderate, Low) 
depending on the difference between the growth rates in FCLNBW and the growth rates of the FCLNBW according to the 
flexible trend. HIGH_CYCLEt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for years 2000, 2005-2008, and zero otherwise. 
MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for years 1994-1999, and zero otherwise. LOW_CYCLEt-1 is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 for years 2001-2004, 2009, and zero otherwise. Model (1) display logistic regression 
marginal estimates while models (2) and (3) report linear regression coefficient estimates. All standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at the firm level. The sample consists of 6687 bank firm year-observations (N) during the period 1995-2010. 
Banks are defined using the following SIC codes: 6020, 6022, 6035 and 6036. All regressions include intercepts, control 
variables and year fixed effects. All the remaining variables are described in the Appendix. z- / t-statistic is in parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates. The significance is designated by *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  
 
 Predicted 
sign 
CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * HIGH_CYCLEt-1 - 
-0.940 
(-1.16) 
-3.653** 
(-2.13) 
-1.968** 
(-2.51) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 - 
-0.384 
(-0.44) 
0.885 
(0.56) 
0.904 
(1.10) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * LOW_CYCLEt-1 - 
-2.152*** 
(-2.57) 
-5.344*** 
(-3.24) 
-2.848*** 
(-3.99) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * HIGH_CYCLEt-1 - 
-0.014 
(-0.94) 
-0.071** 
(-2.20) 
-0.028** 
(-1.96) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 - 
-0.025 
(-1.52) 
-0.048 
(-1.59) 
-0.024* 
(-1.77) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * LOW_CYCLEt-1 - 
-0.003 
(-0.22) 
-0.013 
(-0.42) 
-0.009 
(-0.70) 
HIGH_CYCLEt-1 + 
0.055* 
(1.95) 
0.057*** 
(2.77) 
0.058** 
(2.23) 
LOW_CYCLEt-1 + 
0.022 
(0.73) 
-0.012 
(-0.20) 
-0.004 
(-0.15) 
N  6687 6687 6687 
Pseudo/ Adj. R2  0.019 0.057 0.066 
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Table 7: Accounting conservatism, lending growth cycles and crash risk: The impact of information opacity 
This table report estimates of the relation between conservatism on crash risk conditional on banking cycle. As a proxy for the banking 
cycle we use growth in lending as captured by the change in macroeconomic variable “Commercial and industrial loans outstanding plus 
non-fin commercial paper (FCLNBW)” compiled by The Conference Board, which measures the volume of business loans held by banks 
and commercial papers issued by nonfinancial companies. Then, we use the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter to obtain an estimate of a 
flexible trend of the change in FCLNBW. The parameter λ takes the value of 100. Finally, we classify the period of investigation into 
three sub-periods (High, Moderate, Low) depending on the difference between the growth rates in FCLNBW and the growth rates of the 
FCLNBW according to the flexible trend. HIGH_CYCLEt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for years 2000, 2005-2008, and zero 
otherwise. MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for years 1994-1999, and zero otherwise. LOW_CYCLEt-1 is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 for years 2001-2004, 2009, and zero otherwise. Panel A (B) reports results for banks with above 
(below) median analysts’ forecast dispersion for the year. Models (1)-(2) display logistic regression marginal estimates while models (3) 
– (6) report linear regression coefficient estimates. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The sample consists of 
6687 bank firm year-observations (N) during the period 1995-2010. Banks are defined using the following SIC codes: 6020, 6022, 6035 
and 6036. All regressions include intercepts, control variables and year fixed effects. All the rest variables are described in Appendix. z- / 
t-statistic is in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. The significance is designated by *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
 
 Predicted 
sign 
CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Results for high dispersion at t-1        
LLP_CONSt-1 - 
-1.091*** 
(-2.61)  
-2.225** 
(-2.38)  
-1.016** 
(-2.29)  
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1  
-0.010 
(-1.01)  
-0.048** 
(-2.29)  
-0.024*** 
(-2.61)  
LLP_CONSt-1 * HIGH_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.885 
(-1.02)  
-2.525 
(-1.37)  
-1.428* 
(-1.67) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.334 
(-0.33)  
0.892 
(0.53)  
0.859 
(0.97) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * LOW_CYCLEt-1 -  
-2.072*** 
(-2.19)  
-5.860*** 
(-3.09)  
-3.000*** 
(-3.66) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * HIGH_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.010 
(-0.60)  
-0.075** 
(-2.14)  
-0.034** 
(-2.14) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.019 
(-1.08)  
-0.044 
(-1.34)  
-0.021 
(-1.41) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJ t-1 * LOW_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.001 
(-0.07)  
-0.017 
(-0.50)  
-0.014 
(-0.96) 
HIGH_CYCLEt-1 + 
0.047* 
(1.68) 
0.045 
(1.48) 
0.111** 
(1.98) 
0.137** 
(2.24) 
0.034 
(1.32) 
0.047* 
(1.69) 
LOW_CYCLEt-1 + 
0.027 
(0.91) 
0.021 
(0.63) 
-0.044 
(-0.71) 
-0.045 
(-0.67) 
-0.025 
(-0.87) 
-0.021 
(-0.66) 
N  5652 5652 5652 5652 5652 5652 
Pseudo/ Adj. R2  0.020 0.021 0.057 0.058 0.067 0.069 
Panel A: Results for low dispersion at t-1   
LLP_CONSt-1 - 
-0.162 
(-0.15)  
-0.890 
(-0.34)  
-0.441 
(-0.44)  
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1  
-0.034 
(-1.44)  
-0.038 
(-0.75)  
-0.011 
(-0.47)  
LLP_CONSt-1 * HIGH_CYCLEt-1 -  
1.380 
(0.55)  
-4.493 
(-0.85)  
-1.756 
(-0.73) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 -  
0.135 
(0.08)  
-1.344 
(-0.29)  
-0.243 
(-0.12) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * LOW_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.898 
(-0.61)  
0.748 
(0.20)  
-0.048 
(-0.03) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * HIGH_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.038 
(-1.07)  
-0.033 
(-0.37)  
-0.000 
(-0.00) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.071 
(-1.38)  
-0.046 
(-0.50)  
-0.029 
(-0.68) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * LOW_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.010 
(-0.26)  
-0.041 
(-0.55)  
-0.013 
(-0.35) 
HIGH_CYCLEt-1 + 
0.136** 
(-2.20) 
0.105 
(1.33) 
0.235* 
(1.69) 
0.247 
(1.45) 
0.125* 
(1.93) 
0.113 
(1.50) 
LOW_CYCLEt-1 + 
0.044 
(0.74) 
0.003 
(0.04) 
0.106 
(0.81) 
0.105 
(0.63) 
0.074 
(1.20) 
0.063 
(0.83) 
N  1035 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035 
Pseudo/ Adj. R2  0.048 0.050 0.077 0.074 0.092 0.089 
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Table 8: Accounting conservatism, lending growth cycles and crash risk: The impact bank size  
This table reports estimates of the relation between conservatism on crash risk conditional on banking cycle. As a proxy for the banking 
cycle we use growth in lending as captured by the change in macroeconomic variable “Commercial and industrial loans outstanding plus 
non-fin commercial paper (FCLNBW)” compiled by The Conference Board, which measures the volume of business loans held by banks 
and commercial papers issued by nonfinancial companies. Then, we use the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter to obtain an estimate of a 
flexible trend of the change in FCLNBW. The parameter λ takes the value of 100. Finally, we classify the period of investigation into 
three sub-periods (High, Moderate, Low) depending on the difference between the growth rates in FCLNBW and the growth rates of the 
FCLNBW according to the flexible trend. HIGH_CYCLEt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for years 2000, 2005-2008, and zero 
otherwise. MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for years 1994-1999, and zero otherwise. LOW_CYCLEt-1 is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 for years 2001-2004, 2009, and zero otherwise. Panel A (B) reports results for banks with total assets 
below (above) $1 billion. Models (1)-(2) display logistic regression marginal estimates while models (3) – (6) report linear regression 
coefficient estimates. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The sample consists of 6687 bank firm year-
observations (N) during the period 1995-2010. Banks are defined using the following SIC codes: 6020, 6022, 6035 and 6036. All 
regressions include intercepts, control variables and year fixed effects. All the remaining variables are described in the Appendix. z- / t-
statistic is in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The significance is designated by *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  
 Predicted 
sign 
CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Results for small banks at t-1        
LLP_CONSt-1 - 
-1.627** 
(-2.11)  
-2.827* 
(-1.65)  
-0.937 
(-1.13)  
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1  
-0.003 
(-0.21)  
-0.052* 
(-1.72)  
-0.029** 
(-2.20)  
LLP_CONSt-1 * HIGH_CYCLEt-1 -  -2.358* (-1.77)  
-1.342 
(-0.37)  
-0.224 
(-0.14) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.367 
(-0.27)  
-0.917 
(-0.31)  
-0.211 
(0.14) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * LOW_CYCLEt-1 -  
-3.128** 
(-2.06)  
-6.490** 
(-1.96)  
-2.354* 
(-1.66) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * HIGH_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.007 
(-0.33)  
-0.128** 
(-2.50)  
-0.048** 
(-2.22) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.031 
(-1.23)  
-0.014 
(-0.29)  
-0.014 
(-0.70) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * LOW_CYCLEt-1 -  
0.029 
(1.19)  
-0.016 
(-0.32)  
-0.022 
(-1.04) 
HIGH_CYCLEt-1 + 
0.082** 
(2.24) 
0.081** 
(2.06) 
0.097 
(1.30) 
0.153* 
(1.87) 
0.015 
(0.45) 
0.032 
(0.87) 
LOW_CYCLEt-1 + 
0.058 
(1.40) 
0.039 
(0.86) 
-0.178** 
(-1.98) 
-0.171* 
(-1.79) 
-0.076** 
(-1.96) 
-0.070* 
(-1.67) 
N   3101 3101 3101 3101 3101 3101 
Pseudo/ Adj. R2  0.035 0.037 0.080 0.080 0.101 0.102 
Panel B: Results for large banks at t-1        
LLP_CONSt-1 - 
-0.281 
(-0.66)  
-0.584 
(-0.63)  
-0.446 
(-1.01)  
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1  
-0.023* 
(-1.92)  
-0.036 
(-1.57)  
-0.01 
(-1.34)  
LLP_CONSt-1 * HIGH_CYCLEt-1 -  
0.977 
(0.76)  
-1.579 
(-0.83)  
-1.151 
(-1.34) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 -  --0.627 (-0.62)  
-0.023 
(-0.01)  
0.277 
(0.33) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * LOW_CYCLEt-1 -  -0.674 (-0.93)  
-0.551 
(-0.35)  
-0.738 
(-1.08) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * HIGH_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.018 
(-0.96)  
-0.023 
(-0.57)  
-0.010 
(-0.59) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.023 
(1.08)  
-0.065 
(-1.60)  
-0.025 
(-1.35) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * LOW_CYCLEt-1 -  
-0.027 
(-1.40)  
-0.023 
(-0.61)  
-0.007 
(-0.41) 
HIGH_CYCLEt-1 + 
0.051 
(1.46) 
0.047 
(1.16) 
0.187*** 
(2.59) 
0.163* 
(1.94) 
0.087** 
(2.57) 
0.079** 
(2.04) 
LOW_CYCLEt-1 + 
0.020 
(0.60) 
0.022 
(0.57) 
0.127* 
(1.82) 
0.102 
(1.21) 
0.059* 
(1.83) 
0.049 
(1.27) 
N   3586 3586 3586 3586 3586 3586 
Pseudo/ Adj. R2  0.021 0.022 0.051 0.050 0.065 0.065 
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Table 9: Accounting conservatism, liquidity growth cycles and crash risk 
This table reports estimates of the relation between conservatism on crash risk conditional on banking cycle. As a proxy 
for the banking cycle we use growth in liquidity as captured by the change in macroeconomic variable “FM1 (FM1)”, 
which is the monetary base as defined by M1. Then, we use the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter to obtain an estimate of a 
flexible trend of the FM1. The parameter λ takes the value of 100. Finally, we classify the period of investigation into 
three sub-periods (High, Moderate, Low) depending on the difference between the growth rates in FM1 and the growth 
rates of the FM1 according to the flexible trend. HIGH_CYCLEt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for years 1995-
1998, 2000, 2007, and zero otherwise. MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for years 1998, 
1999, 2001, 2005, 2006 and zero otherwise. LOW_CYCLEt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for years 1994, 2002-
2004, 2009, and zero otherwise. Model (1) display logistic regression marginal estimates while models (2) and (3) report 
linear regression coefficient estimates. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The sample consists 
of 6687 bank firm year-observations (N) during the period 1995-2010. Banks are defined using the following SIC codes: 
6020, 6022, 6035 and 6036. All regressions include intercepts, control variables and year fixed effects. All the remaining 
variables are described in the Appendix. z- / t-statistic is in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The significance 
is designated by *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  
 
 Predicted 
sign 
CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * HIGH_CYCLEt-1 - 
-1.650* 
(-1.86) 
-1.161 
(-0.62) 
-0.687 
(-0.85) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 - 
-1.138** 
(-2.12) 
-2.017 
(-1.55) 
-0.916 
(-1.44) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * LOW_CYCLEt-1 - -0.805 (-1.04) 
-3.574** 
(-2.51) 
-1.582** 
(-2.35) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * HIGH_CYCLEt-1 - 
-0.011 
(-0.62) 
-0.049 
(-1.42) 
-0.022 
(-1.42) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * MODERATE_CYCLEt-1 - 
-0.011 
(-0.82) 
-0.007 
(-0.25) 
-0.004 
(-0.29) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * LOW_CYCLEt-1 - 
-0.019 
(-1.16) 
-0.088*** 
(-2.91) 
-0.043*** 
(-3.08) 
HIGH_CYCLEt-1 + 
-0.028 
(-1.06) 
-0.123** 
(-2.21) 
-0.045* 
(-1.76) 
LOW_CYCLEt-1 + -0.044* (-1.66) 
-0.012 
(-0.21) 
-0.002 
(-0.08) 
N  6687 6687 6687 
Pseudo/ Adj. R2  0.019 0.056 0.064 
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Table 10: Accounting conservatism, growth in systemic risk and crash risk 
This table reports estimates of the relation between conservatism on crash risk conditional on banking cycle. As a proxy 
for the banking cycle we use the change in “CATFIN” a measure of aggregate systemic risk developed by Allen, Bali and 
Tang (2012). We classify the period of investigation into three sub-periods (High, Moderate, Low) depending on the 
change in CATFIN measured on February 01 of each year as follows: HIGH SRISKt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 
1 for years 1999-2001, 2008, 2009, and zero otherwise. MODERATE SRISKt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for 
years 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2003, and zero otherwise. LOW RISKt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for 
years 1996, 2004-2007, and zero otherwise. Model (1) display logistic regression marginal estimates while models (2) and 
(3) report linear regression coefficient estimates. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The 
sample consists of 6687 bank firm year-observations (N) during the period 1995-2010. Banks are defined using the 
following SIC codes: 6020, 6022, 6035 and 6036. All regressions include intercepts, control variables and year fixed 
effects. All the remaining variables are described in the Appendix. z- / t-statistic is in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. The significance is designated by *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  
 
 Predicted 
sign 
CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * HIGH SRISKt-1 - 
-1.410* 
(-1.88) 
-4.611*** 
(-2.73) 
-2.521*** 
(-3.27) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * MODERATE SRISKt-1 - 
-1.730** 
(-2.58) 
-1.425 
(0.99) 
-0.596 
(-0.90) 
LLP_CONSt-1 * LOW SRISKt-1 - -0.415 (-0.62) 
-1.344 
(-0.96) 
-0.317 
(-0.47) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * HIGH SRISKt-1 - 
-0.022 
(-1.54) 
-0.060* 
(-1.94) 
-0.028** 
(-2.06) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * MODERATE SRISKt-1 - 
-0.014 
(-0.83) 
-0.019 
(-0.63) 
-0.009 
(-0.71) 
LLA_CONS_UNADJt-1 * LOW SRISKt-1 - 
-0.004 
(-0.25) 
-0.058* 
(-1.79) 
-0.026* 
(-1.80) 
HIGH SRISKt-1 + 
0.077*** 
(2.82) 
0.248*** 
(4.49) 
0.078*** 
(3.02) 
LOW SRISKt-1 + 
0.041 
(1.35) 
0.060* 
(1.76) 
0.024 
(0.88) 
N  6687 6687 6687 
Pseudo/ Adj. R2  0.019 0.056 0.064 
 
 
 
  
 
